While your statements are true in a sense they are also smoke and mirrors that add nothing to the specifics of climate change. The models are "just models" but that is true of every human construct designed to explain experimentally observed facts - in the physical sciences explanation is synonymous with model
Not the way I was using the term. In climate science, there are a lot of
computer models. I'm definitely not talking about $\displaystyle\mathbf{F}=\frac{d\mathbf{p}}{dt}$ or $E=m c^2$ as a model. Climate science does not have such well-defined equations that explain everything. Far less is known about how the computer models work than about Newton's Second Law or Einstein's Theory of Relativity. And while it is true that computer models can play a role in a scientific theory, a theory is considerably more comprehensive than just the computer models.
- thus the models of the climatologists are scientific theories
See above.
proffered to explain observed changes in the earth's climate since the beginning of industrial production of CO[SUB]2[/SUB] .
Here's why I think your opening statements and those that follow (quoted below) serve to obscure the matter that is under debate here. Climate models offer concrete predictions that can be tested
But not in any experiment: only in observational studies. It is a commonplace in statistics that to establish causality, you must perform an experiment. Observational studies and correlations will not get you there.
while a philosophical discussion concentrated on epistemological models of cause/effect offer not concrete predictions in climatology.
Well, I wasn't trying to offer concrete predictions in climatology. I am not a climate scientist.
This obscures rather than clarifies the question of accuracy of predictions in climatological models. Below are some considerations that ought to be on the table for this discussion.
- Climate models are explanations (some better than others) that offer predictions based on past and current observations of the facts of measurable climate features (temperature, precipitation, air pressure, atmospheric composition, humidity, sea surface temperatures, rates of evaporation, storm frequency, storm severity, and so forth) and since they offer predictions they can be tested by checking how accurate (or inaccurate) the predictions are.
- Models/explanations are critiqued and tested by experiments and observations designed to see if the predictions inherent in a particular model can withstand serious critical examination.
- Accumulating observational data and checking predicted climate events against observed data enables refinement of models subjected to rigorous criticism based on observed data.
Let me repeat: there are no experiments available here. There are observations, sure. But one of the first principles of statistical design (and all of science is based on statistics - statistics is absolutely
central to all science) is that you cannot establish causality - you cannot answer the question "Why?" with an observational study
at all. You absolutely have to do an experiment.
Predictions are certainly part of a scientific theory, but a scientific theory should be broader than that: it should explain the
why. The computer models can never do that.
Your post argues about causality (a philosophical perspective rather than a specifically scientific one)
I beg to differ. I am, by training, a mathematical physicist (Ph.D. from Virginia Tech, 2007), and I can assure you that causality is
central to the scientist's thinking. This is what drives most scientists: to know the why!
without grappling with the more precise issue of correspondence between predicted events in specific models of climate change and actual measured events.
The reason I did not grapple with that issue is because I see it as secondary to these more fundamental statistical issues (at their heart, I think the problems are statistical; I would not object to calling the issues epistemological, either).
It does not matter if rigorous philosophical causality is proved or not if the predicted events of a specific model correspond with observed events in the time frame predicted by the model.
It does matter, because if there is no understanding of the
why, then there is zero confidence that the model will work in cases when the conditions are even slightly different, much less radically different.
If the model posits that increased CO[SUB]2[/SUB] in the composition of the atmosphere corresponds to certain climate events of a harmful kind and later observation correspond with the predictions then from a scientific point of view the specific model that made the predictions is a viable scientific theory for predicting climate change consequences of increasing production of CO[SUB]2[/SUB] by human beings.
Well, as I mentioned before, the model is not synonymous with a theory. A model is a subset of a theory. Theories should absolutely have models, but they should have a lot more than that.
I have to say, it's a pleasure debating with you: you stick to issues, and don't get side-tracked by
ad hominem fallacies. Quite refreshing! I'd like to think I do the same - please point it out to me if I don't.